• tags: ncw global transaction strategy foreign policy privacy surveillance

    • Trust me, along with drones, these frontier-settling technologies will most definitely infiltrate our society in coming years, just like the military’s Internet and GPS did before.


      The results will be similar: that much more capacity for individuals to be identified, tracked and watched, meaning anti-social behavior will become that much harder to pull off. As usual the libertarians will spot the end of freedom, but for those of us not interested in committing terror, crimes and mischief, the larger truth is that we’ll actually experience more freedom from all of those things.

    • In the security realm, the drones and biometrics, which at first glance are a bit too touchy for initial “sales” to advanced societies, find their original usage in my non-integrated gap regions, where frontiers need settling. But eventually those “frugal innovations” (another biz term of art) make their way into globalization’s core economies, forever altering the security landscape there.
    • The result will be the same the world over: the end of off-grid locations, no where to hide, etc.  You will be held responsible for what you do. There will be no frontiers left in which you can disappear.
    • this is the real and unassailable path toward “victory” (a misplaced term to be sure) in the long war
  • tags: coin ncw doctrine future war Futuring

    • But Gates’s departure, the wide-ranging overhaul of Barack Obama’s national security team, and, most importantly, the president’s decision to withdraw 33,000 soldiers from Afghanistan by next summer shows that the “Rumsfeld Doctrine” is now the accepted standard operating procedure for current and future policymakers. In the end, Rumsfeld won the Doctrine War.
    • Immediately upon entering office, Gates directed the Pentagon to focus on the present crisis in Iraq rather than Rumsfeld’s goals of transformation for the future. Reversing long-held Rumsfeld positions, Gates ordered increases in headcounts for the Army and Marine Corps and implemented the troop surge and a protect-the-population counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.


      But the setback for the Rumsfeld Doctrine was only temporary. Obama now seems to agree with Rumsfeld that the long U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in an unhealthy dependency by the hosts — Obama’s speeches on Iraq and Afghanistan have always included his insistence that these countries take responsibility for their security within explicit deadlines.

    • Rumsfeld’s and Schoomaker’s redesign of the Army into a lighter, more mobile, and more expeditionary force seems permanent. Gone is the Cold War and Desert Storm concept of the long buildup of armor as prelude to a massive decisive battle. Instead, globally mobile brigade combat teams will provide deterrence, respond to crises, and sustain expeditionary campaigns.
    • There now seems to be a near-consensus inside Washington that the large open-ended ground campaigns that Rumsfeld resisted are no longer sustainable. The former defense secretary’s preference for special operations forces, air power, networked intelligence, and indigenous allies is now back in vogue. Even Gen. David Petraeus, who burnished his reputation by reversing Rumsfeld’s policies in Iraq, will now implement Rumsfeld’s doctrine in eastern Afghanistan.
    • If the battle is over management style, Gates wins in a knockout. But events, combined with experience gained through trial-and-error, have given the ultimate victory to Rumsfeld’s military doctrine.

Posted from Diigo. The rest of my favorite links are here.